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Draft Recommendation 
on Europe's external relations 
The Assembly, 
Considering that Europe can prosper only if peace is preserved; 
Considering that the Western European countries share the common objective of promoting democracy 
and human rights universally and that this objective does not constitute interference in the internal affairs 
of other states ; 
Considering that Western Europe's foreign policy must demonstrate a readiness to co-operate with 
all parts of the world in order to assure the security and well-being of their peoples; 
Considering that military security, which presupposes a stable balance of forces, can best be 
maintained through the preservation of the Atlantic Alliance ; 
Concerned at the intensification of the Soviet Union's armament efforts ; 
Considering further that an uncontrolled arms race between East and West cannot increase our 
security, but only precipitate new dangers ; 
Convinced that the continuation and extension of detente with the objective of arms control and 
balanced force reduction agreements serve the interests of peace and military security ; 
Considering that East-West co-operation in all fields is an essential element of security and should 
be continued on a stable basis; 
Considering that the North-South dialogue should be intensified in order to overcome as soon as 
possible the gap between North and South; 
Convinced that economic and social progress and hence internal security and stability are in the 
interest of industrial and developing nations alike ; 
Aware that Europe's dependence on imports of raw materials constitutes a high degree of vulnerability; 
Considering that the restoration of democracy in Greece, Portugal and Spain is a great achievement 
for Europe as a whole which must be consolidated through appropriate assistance measures by Western 
Europe; 
Convinced that world economic recovery and hence the economic stabilisation of the western demo-
cracies require close international co-operation in the political and economic fields ; 
Considering that the activities of the WEU Council are based upon a treaty which grants it wide-
ranging responsibilities extending into the economic and social area, even though these are effectively 
exercised through other international organisations, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
I. Examine regularly, particularly at its ministerial meetings, all the problems raised by the application 
of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty with a view to ascertaining the extent to which the 
opportunities that this article offers have been fully exploited; 
2. Examine regularly the military balance and state of East-West relations in Europe and maintain 
close co-operation between member countries in order to iJromote the progress of detente and negotiations 
on the reduction and control of armaments ; 
3. Study the security aspects of the North-South dialogue; 
4. Investigate the problem of conventional arms transfers especially to third world countries with a 
view to developing a common policy for the control of weapon exports; 
5. Promote close co-operation in all appropriate international organisations with the democratic 
nations of Southern Europe and the Mediterranean region and support these nations' early entry into the 
European Community and their share in the process of European integration. 
2 
DOCUMENT 790 
Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Gessner, "Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. This report attempts to outline the external 
reliations of Eu:rope. The Rapporte'll'r is aware 
that such an endeavour is extremely difficult and 
would require, to be in ooy sense complete, much 
greater length than is customary for reports of 
this Assembly. He must therefore limit his dis-
cussion to a few central aspects of European 
foreign relations and cannot treat even these in 
a systematic or comprehensive manner. 
2. Security policy, the central responsibility 
of WEU, will provide the emphasis of this report; 
in this connection, however, the conditioning 
factors, goals, and interests of Europe's external 
relations will also be examined. For this purpose 
it is first of all necessary to select the definition 
of Europe most appropriate in the present 
context. Further, the internal preconditions of 
Europe's foreign relations must be discussed with 
candour. Only on the basis of such an analysis 
can one grasp Europe1s contemporary position 
in the world with some degree of realism and 
precision and examine Europe's most important 
foreign policy interests and objectives in order 
to cla~fy the foreign policy options available to 
it in its present state. 
3. In speaking of Europe one can refer to quite 
different geographical expanses, political entities, 
or international groupings. For the purpose of 
this report it would perhaps be most logical to 
select a definition of Europe which is as flexible 
as possible without, on the other hand, being so 
nebulous as to lose all practical meaning. An 
immediate limitation is given by the fact that 
Western Europe provides the starting point for 
our discussion. This concept of Europe embraces 
in the first instance the domain of the European 
Community and WEU, without, however, 
restricting itself to these two organisations. The 
European Community and WEU conceive of 
themselves as open communities, and the Euro-
pean Community is presently negotiating the 
enlargement to the south. This fact alone 
requires a definition of Europe more flexible 
than one limited to the existing institutional 
structures of the European Community and 
WEU. Moreover, on the level of security policy, 
an integral component of foreign policy, no less 
than thirteen European nations have bound 
themselves to an alliance with the United States 
and Canada. 
4. For these reasons the Rapporteur prefers to 
use a different criterion of selection and speak 
of the European, western-type democracies, i.e. 
of those European states which share the common 
foundation of pluralist democracy. Such a defini-
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tion would embrace the member states of the 
Council of Europe along with a number of 
smaller countries which have not, or not yet, 
acceded to that body. More important however 
than determining the precise numbe; of state~ 
to be included in our examination of Europe's 
external relations is our definition of this com-
munity of nations on the basis of certain shared 
values, namely a common dedication to western 
pluralist democracy and a common concern for 
human rights. In this sense, Europe would thus 
refer to democratic Europe. This concept would 
not embrace the continent of Europe in all polit-
ical and geographical respects, which would of 
course also include the Eastern European com-
munist countries. Even if one regards the con-
ference on security and co-operation in Europe 
as a first manifestation of this "pan-Europe", 
allusion to common external relations is hardly 
in place. But common foreign policy instruments 
are largely lacking as well for democratic Europe, 
the concept chosen by the Rapporteur. Such 
instruments are no doubt most fully developed 
in the European Community. Therefore great 
weight must be placed upon the initiatives 
developed here. In addition, however, one must 
examine a wide range of interests and objectives 
which extend far beyond the domain of the 
Europe of the Nine and of WEU and which 
can be numbered among the foundations of 
Europe's common external relations. 
11. Internal preconditions of Europe's external 
relations 
5. The democratic European states discussed in 
this report belong to different alliances and 
groupings. They maintain both joint and separate 
relations with the rest of the world, as is evident 
in their membership of various regional group-
ings. Only two such organisations, however, are 
responsible for the defence and security concerns 
of their member states : NATO, which includes 
the United States and Canada; and Western 
European Union, which joins seven European 
nations in a collective defence pact with a 
guarantee of long-term validity. WEU does not, 
however, dispose of its own military forces but 
relies on those of NATO : thus there exists no 
autonomous European defence community. 
Rather, the European members of the Atlantic 
Alliance (Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic 
of Germany, France, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal and Turkey) are convinced that the 
maintenance of European security requires close 
co-operation with Canada and the United States 
to counter successfully the threat which the 
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Soviet military potential poses to Western 
Europe. 
6. This European-American defence com-
munity must be regarded as a structural element 
of the European state system. In other words, 
the American presence in Europe must be regard-
ed as permanent. In its core this community has 
remained essentially the same as it has developed 
since 1949, even though not all European nations 
maintain the same type of ties with the Alliance. 
Its Scandinavian members, for example, are care-
ful to take the northern balance of forces into 
consideration in their relationship to the Atlantic 
Alliance. They allow neither foreign military 
bases nor the stationing of nuclear weapons on 
their territory. France withdrew from the NATO 
integrated command structure in 1966. The rela-
tionship of Greece and Turkey to NATO has 
been altered as a consequence of the Cyprus 
conflict of 197 4, Greece having withdrawn to a 
considerable extent from the military integration. 
Turkey's relations with the United States were 
burdened for several years by the American arms 
embargo but have been normalised following the 
latter's recent repeal. NATO remains weakened, 
nevertheless, by the unsolved Cyprus question on 
its southern flank. 
7. A major gain for Europe and the entire 
Atlantic Alliance has been the elimination of 
dictatorial regimes in Portugal and Greece. With 
the domestic political transformations in Spain 
following the death of Franco, Western Europe 
can now be said to be composed entirely of 
democratic states. This important fact deserves 
to be emphasised, for it proves that democracy 
has not lost its attraction as a way of life. Spain 
has long been tied to the United States through 
a bilateral defence pact and is presently applying 
for membership of the European Community ; 
whether it will choose to join NATO as well 
remains an open question for the moment. The 
Rapporteur would emphasise that this decision 
lies entirely in the hands of the Spanish Govern-
ment and the Spanish people. 
8. Ten of the thirteen European members of 
NATO (Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic of 
Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Norway and Turkey) 
have informally joined together in the so-called 
Eurogroup within the Atlantic Alliance and have 
adopted common programmes, particularly in the 
years since 1970. France, Ireland and Portugal 
were also invited to join in this co-operative 
effort but chose not to participate. Portugal has 
since decided to join the group. The fact that 
the countries composing the Eurogroup have 
consciously avoided placing their co-operation on 
a formal basis proves that it is not an attempt 
to create an autonomous European defence com-
munity. The formation of a European programme 
group to harmonise defence and armaments pro-
posals demonstrates, on the other hand, the need 
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perceived in Europe for greater co-operation in 
matters of mutual defence. It should, however, 
not alter the existing foundations of the alliance. 
The precise forms in which defence co-operation 
could be organised presently constitute, in the 
view of the Rapporteur, an open question. 
9. A number of observers have perceived pos-
sibilities of co-operation in defence and security 
issues within the European Community. Such 
proposals discussed among experts envisage 
among other things the creation of an integrated 
defence sector in the European Community 
similar to 'the existing European political co-
operation. The Rapporteur regards such pro-
posals with scepticism. He is 'Convinced that, 
while European political co-operation has devel-
oped into an extremely useful and effective 
instrument of the European Community and has 
led to a considerable capacity for action, the 
defence of Europe can be effectively organised 
only within the Atlantic Alliance. The reasons for 
this are obvious. First of all, several member 
states of the European Community have openly 
declared their opposition to such military co-
operation ; the attempt to expand the European 
Community into a new defence community none-
theless could create considerable dangers for the 
level of European integration already achieved. 
The Rapporteur is also of the opinion that 
Europe's strategic position does not permit such 
a solution. He is convinced that Europe's military 
vulnerability cannot in this manner be reduced. 
One cannot recognise in the proposals any in-
crease in Europe's security as compared to the 
present alliance system. On the contrary, the 
United States could conclude that a common 
responsibility for Europe's military security no 
longer exists to the same degree as previously. 
Such a development would not promote the main-
tenance of a stable balance of power in Europe. 
The European Community has proved so success-
ful in foreign policy precisely because it has not 
appeared as a military power and has made no 
claims to domination, but is rather a factor of 
conciliation and peace. 
10. On the basis of European political co-opera-
tion, Europe has succeeded in making its voice 
heard and its weight felt in many cases : 
- at the conference on security and co-
operation in Europe, the European Com-
munity acted largely as a group, making 
its own contributions and proposals. The 
European Community member states 
presently share a common foundation for 
their positions on all essential questions 
of Ostpolitik and detente ; 
- the European Community has similarly 
been represented as a community in inter-
national negotiations involving economic 
and energy issues, such as those spon-
sored by UNCT AD and the CIEC. The 
European Community also appears as a 
community in the United Nations, and 
the country providing the current Pre-
sident of the Council is authorised to 
speak for the Nine as a group ; 
- the European Cotnmunity has conducted 
the dialogue with the United States 
begun in September 1973 on the basis 
of mutually-agreed positions. A practice 
of close bilateral consultations between 
the Community and the United States 
has now developed from these consulta-
tions; 
- with its declaration on the Middle East 
of 6th November 1973 the Nine adopted 
a joint position regarding the Middle 
East conflict and introduced a balanced 
common Middle E-ast policy. They have 
subsequently repeatedly taken a position 
on this problem. 
] 1. All in 1all, the European Community is today 
in a position to adopt common policies towards 
almost all significant international issues, includ-
ing those relevant to international security. This 
contribution to Europe's foreign relations should 
not be underestimated, even if the voice of the 
C{)llllmunity cannot speak for the potentially 
much larger Europe beyond the borders of the 
Nine. 
12. This larger Europe has in the Council of 
Europe an institution which now unites practic-
ally all the democratic nations of the continent 
and which, given sufficient consensus, can express 
the position of its members on international 
affairs. The Council of Europe exercises an 
indispensable bridge-building function between 
the members and non-members of the European 
Community. It has promoted and developed joint 
solutions for many problems beyond the borders 
of the European Community which affect all the 
democratic nations of Europe. Its contributions 
to the implementation of human rights are 
undeniable. It has proved useful and deserves 
praise in the area of cultural exchange, in the 
promotion of social rights, and in the struggle 
against international terrorism. The fact that 
neutral and non-aligned nations as well as states 
with specific foreign and defence policy ties are 
represented in the Council of Europe often pre-
vents the formation of a foreign policy consensus, · 
even though the Council of Europe's joint 
action, for instance in the United Nations and 
other international bodies, would be highly desir-
able. Both the Parliamentary Assembly and the 
Committee of Ministers concern themselves none-
theless with a large number of international 
questions and have made valuable contributions 
inter alia to the CSCE, the East-West relation-
ship, questions of the third world, Africa and the 
Middle East. 
13. Naturally, with such a diversity of members, 
the Council of Europe cannot take major steps 
5 
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in foreign policy or, a fortiori, defence matters. 
However, due emphasis must be laid on its 
importance as a forum, both at Committee of 
Ministers and at Parliamentary Assembly level, 
for discussions between democratic European 
countries which have so often proved extremely 
fruitful on such matters as respect for human 
rights, East-West relations and the North-South 
dialogue. Your Rapporteur is happy to associate 
himself with the Committee members who asked 
for this remark to be included in the report. 
14. Even this brief examination of the internal 
preconditions of Europe's external relations 
demonstrates that almost all of the European 
international organisations combine a variety of 
partially overlapping ties and commitments 
which do not, however, evidence a homogenous 
structure. Even the most advanced European 
union, the European Community and its highly-
effective European political co-operation, is 
comprised of members united simultaneously in 
a plethora of other significant international 
European organisations. It suffices to point here 
to the simple fact that members of the European 
Community, WEU and NATO belong at the same 
time to the Council of Europe, the OECD, the 
Nordic Council and other similar groupings, thus 
bringing their specific interests to, but also 
accepting additional responsibilities from, each 
of these organisations. Finally, the reality of 
national interests distinct from all attempts at 
international co-operation must not be denied or 
minimised. On this basis, the process of common 
foreign policy formation thus represents a 
tremendously complex task, which becomes more 
difficult to fulfil according to the number of 
states involved. This task places great demands 
on the willingness to compromise of all European 
governments and therefore often places results 
in an uncertain light. 
ID. Europe's position in the world 
15. Europe exercised a dominant influence in 
world politics for many years in the past. This 
is no longer the case, for two world wars have 
left major traces and destroyed the traditional 
European state system. This insight is clearly 
expressed in the document on Europe's political 
identity published by the nine foreign ministers 
on 14th December 1973. This text reads: 
"Although in the past the European 
countries were individually able to play a 
major role on the international scene, present 
international problems are difficult for any 
of the Nine to solve alone. International 
developments and the growing concentration 
of power and responsibility in the hands 
of a very small number of great powers 
mean that Europe must unite and speak 
increasingly with a single voice if it wants 
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to make itself heard and play its proper 
role in the world." 
The combined potential of the European demo-
cracies is considerable. The potential of the 
countries of the European Community alone 
represents an order of magnitude comparable in 
respect to a series of factors of power to that 
of the two superpowers. Measured by its gross 
national product, its population, its monetary 
reserves and its share of world trade, the Euro-
pean Community is equal and in some respects 
superior to the superpowers. The European Com-
munity takes first place, for example, in world 
trade. Wide-ranging conclusions have been drawn 
from these facts, including the thesis that the 
European Community will "necessarily lead to a 
superstate and that this superstate will sooner 
or later ineluctably result in a superpower." 1 
16. The Rapporteur can hardly imagine, how-
ever, that the European Community will emerge 
as a superpower, at least in the sense in which 
this word is normally used. Decisive internal 
and external preconditions for such a develop-
ment are lacking, for it does not suffice to 
point to economic potential and the illusion of a 
defence union as proof of the superpower quality 
of the existing European Community. Equally, 
if not more important is, in the view of the 
Rapporteur, the consideration of Europe's eco-
nomic and military vulnerability, for this vul-
nerability determines how Europe defines its 
foreign policy and forms its relations with the 
rest of the world. Prime Minister Tindemans' 
report on European integration is based on the 
accurate assumption that Europe's strategic posi-
tion, dependence on exports and raw materials 
and lack of a homogenous internal structure 
force it to find its way to a common foreign 
policy: 
"That which struck me in all my conver-
sations was above all the widespread feeling 
of our impotence and vulnerability. This 
is a new experience for our peoples in recent 
history. The unequal distribution of material 
goods threatens the stability of the world 
economic system, the exhaustion of natural 
resources heavily burdens the future of 
industrial society and the internationalisa-
tion of economic activity increases the 
dependence of our productive apparatus. 
Our nations are too weak to accept this 
challenge by themselves. What importance 
do individual voices have today, aside from 
those of the superpowers ?... 
The reasons for a joint involvement of 
our nations in the world are, seen objectively, 
1. Johan Galtung, Kapitalistisohe Grossmaoht Europa 
oder Die Gemeinsohaft der Konzerne ?, Reinbeck bei 
Hamburg 1973, page 11. 
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obvious : they a;rise from the correlation of 
forces and from the dimensions of the prob-
lems we face. At the same time they are, 
viewed subjectively, deeply felt by our 
peoples : our vulnerability and relative 
impotence are all too readily apparent. The 
combination of these two factors renders our 
external relations one of the most important 
motives for European integration and there-
fore the European union. has to conduct a 
foreign policy." 
17. The Rapporteur concurs with this view ex-
pressed in the Tindemans report. In his opinion 
the conclusion emerges that Europe's involvement 
in the world must be directed not at attaining the 
attributes of a superpower, but rather Europe 
should prove itself a factor of conciliation, co-
operation and peace. Since Europe's character 
makes it primarily a civil power 1 based essen-
tially on civil rather than military forms of 
power, its greatest foreign policy task is not 
to build a new centre of military might, but to 
contribute to political peace and to a civil world 
order through the example of its domestic order 
which aims at the implementation of social 
justice, democratic liberties and human rights. 
18. The two world wars have largely destroyed 
the basis of Europe's previous military and poli-
tical might ; the two superpowers today confront 
one another on its soil. In Eastern Europe this 
development at the end of the second world 
war led to a relationship of clear subordination 
according to the traditional logic of power pol-
itics. Western Europe, by contrast, has remained 
an important centre of world trade and, in polit-
ical terms, has emerged as more than a mere 
junior partner of the United States. An imperial 
relationship was avoided, in good part because 
of close European-American cultural ties, 
although Western Europe's military security rests 
upon the alliance with America and especially 
upon the latter's nuclear guarantee. Thus, while 
Europe's capacity for military action has been 
decreased, the political, economic, social and cul-
tural possibilities open to it remain considerable. 
This is due no doubt in part to the circumstance 
that in the atomic age the increasing destructive-
ness of nuclear weapons has if anything reduced 
the likelihood of their use. The former American 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger expressed 
this p'aradox as early as 1965: "Military might 
has never been so strong as today, but neither was 
it ever so useless as at present." 2 
19. Europe derives from this recognition con-
siderable room for manoeuvre in the non-military 
1. Fran<;ois Duchene, Die Rolle Europas im Welt-
system : Von der regionalen zur planetarisohen Interde-
pendenz, in : Zivilmacht Europa - Supermacht oder 
Partner '1, Frankfurt 1973, page 33. 
2. Henry Kissinger, The troubled partnership, New 
York 1965, page 18. 
field, even though it does not strive to estabHsh 
a third force between the two superpowers. In 
the view of the Rapporteur, a series of oppor-
tunities present themselves for Europe's role in 
world politics : 
20. (i) Regarding the relationship between the 
two major nuclear powers, Europe possesses suffi-
cient independent political and economic signifi-
cance to exercise a conciliating role. An essen-
tial objective of European foreign policy should 
thus be today to pre.vent renewed East-West con-
frontation and a possible return to the cold war. 
In the phase of Soviet-American bilateralism, as 
is developed in the early seventies with a series 
of comprehensive agreements between the two 
superpowers including the agreement on the pre-
vention of nuclear war of 22nd Jum.e 1973, many 
Europeans feared that the Soviet Union and the 
United States would be in a position to decide 
the fate of Europe over the heads of the Euro-
peans. This impression is, in the Rapporteur's 
opinion, inaccurate, for Europe can have no 
interest in a relationship between the super-
powers marked by hostility and confrontation. 
Such confrontation would largely exclude any 
rapprochement between East and West and fur-
ther cement the division of our continent. 
Europe's policy should instead be to promote 
its interest in stable and continuing co-operation 
between East and West through close consulta-
tion with the United States and corresponding 
contacts with the USSR. 
21. The conference on security and co-operation 
in Europe, in which the United: States and 
Canada as well as the Soviet Union took part, 
provides a successful example of how construc-
tive co-operation between East and West can be 
arranged. This remains true even though undeni-
able difficulties became apparent at the CSCE 
follow-up conference in Belgrade· in the spring 
of this year. The Helsinki final act opens up 
opportunities for the European Community as 
well as for individual European states to broaden 
their bilateral relations with the Soviet Union. 
The European Community is also presently con-
ducting talks with COMECON in order to exa-
mine how far the two organisations can agree 
on mutual co-operation. 
22. Co-ordination of European and American 
foreign policy takes place primarily within the 
framework of the Atlantic Alliance. In addition, 
a permanent dialogue between the European 
Communi,ty and the United States has developed 
since 1973 wh~ch concerns especially economic 
affairs. 
23. (ii) Japan offers another possibility of close 
co-operation with Europe. Europe shares with 
Japan a number of similarities with regard to 
its economic and strategic situation. Like Europe, 
Japan is extraordinarily dependent on foreign 
raw materials and export-oriented at the same 
7 
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time. The alliance with the United States is, as 
far as security is concerned, decisive for both 
partners. Both Japan and Europe number among 
the most important industrial centres of the 
world yet do not play any significant military 
role. The renunciation of a role as a military 
power has been elevated to a guiding principle 
of Japanese foreign policy. Japan and Europe 
share an interest in participating in decisions 
affecting the world economy. In some respects, 
such as the maintenance of export opportunities, 
Japan and Europe appear as competitors, yet 
this does not diminish their broad convergence of 
interests in the problems of the world economy. 
24. Japan's export surplus with the European 
Community has risen dramatically in recent 
years, amounting to around five thousand million 
United States dollars· in 1977. The European 
Community is therefore seeking, ·along with 
Japan and the United States, to limit the result-
ing dangers to the world economy. All three 
parties have committed themselves to fulfilling 
their common responsibilities in maintaining free 
international trade. Progress has already been 
achieved in economic discussions between the 
Community and Japan. 
25. Japan is an important partner of Europe 
in all economic issues. The triangular relationship 
between Japan, Europe and the United States 
has been strongly emphasised in the latter coun-
try, particularly through the activities of the 
trilateral commission, one of whose founders is 
President Carter's current National Security 
Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski. This trilateral 
concept can prove quite useful in the opinion of 
the Rapporteur, as far as world economy is con-
cerned, although he would emphasise that it must 
not lead to the formation of a b1oc of powerful 
industrialised nations, which could lead to a 
hardening towards the third world and a stale-
mate in the North-South dialogue. 
26. (iii) Europe's readiness to co-operate with 
all parts of the world should certainly not exclude 
China. Only recently, on 8th April of this year, 
the European Community concluded a commer-
cial treaty with the People's Republic of China. 
It should really be self-evident that such a treaty 
is directed against no one, but serves the exclusive 
purpose of broadening international economic 
.co-operation. The Rapporteur believes that secu-
rity considerations that have attached to the 
Chinese-European relationship cannot be a deci-
sive objective in the further development of 
Europe's ties to China. Co-operation between 
China and Europe could certainly take on a 
certain significance for Chinese domestic develop-
ment as far as economic and technological mat-
ters are concerned, and Europe, as an econo-
mically highly-developed region, could certainly 
make a contribution. Europe could also help 
constructively to bring China into discussions of 
major international issues. A security alliance 
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with the People's Republic of China, however, is 
not, in the view of the Rapporteur, an object of 
discussion. 
27. (iv) Europe can and must also play a con-
ciliating role in the North-South dialogue. The 
European Community is already connooted with 
fifty-three developing countries of Africa, the 
Pacific and the Caribbean through the Lome 
Convention. Other European nations, such as 
Sweden, are making major contributions to 
development policy. Europe's geographical 
proximity and traditional ties that many Euro-
pean states have with Africa should lead it 
really to doolare its general solidarity with that 
continent's strivings for independence and so 
contribute to guaranteeing the peaceful economic 
and social development of the African continent. 
This does not exclude the careful examination 
and evaluation of the objectives and operating 
methods of the particular forces active iu Africa. 
28. As pointed out in Professor Hofer's recent 
report on the African situation to the Council 
of Europe, co-operation between these two con-
tinents must be the co-operation of equal part-
ners. Democratic Europe, whose member states 
have granted independence to their former colo-
nial possessions, can play a major role in streng-
thening the independence of the young African 
nations, some of which again face the danger 
of losing their independence through external 
intervention and the presence of foreign troops. 
29. (v) Similar considerations apply as well to 
the Middle East. That region's conflict potential 
and geographical proximity demand a specifi-
cally European contribution to peace in this 
region. This contribution could not, of course, 
be of a military nature, but could well assume 
economic dimensions. 
30. The European Community has worked, 
especially since 1973, for the restoration of peace 
in the Middle East and has repeatedly issued 
policy declarations concerning this area. Since 
1974 it has conducted the so-called Arab-Euro-
pean dialogue with the Arab states, which is con-
ceived as a long-range endeavour to intensify 
European-Arab co-operation. This dialogue 
should not, however, affect the continuing efforts 
to establish a lasting peace in the Middle East. 
The prospects for such a peace have brightened 
OOI,lsiderably since the signing of an outline agree-
ment between Egypt and Israel on 17th Septem-
ber 1978. This agreement calls for the conclusion 
of a peace treaty between the two countries 
within three months. Europe could contribute 
to the achievement of the long-desired peace 
settlement by offering its comprehensive co-
operation with all the nations of the Middle 
East. The preamble of the Camp David agree-
ment states : 
8 
"Peace requires respect for the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity and political indepen-
dence of every state in the area and their 
right to live in peace within secure and 
recognised boundaries free from threats or 
acts of force. Progress towards that goal 
can accelerate the movement towards a new 
era of reconciliation in the Middle East 
marked by co-operation in promoting econo-
mic development, in maintaining stability 
and in assuring security." 
IV. External policy interests and objectives 
31. The Rapporteur will attempt in this section 
of his presentation to outline the most significant 
interests and objectives of Europe's foreign 
relations. As previously mentioned, he cannot 
provide in this limited space a comprehensive 
and systematic treatment of this subject ; none-
theless he considers it important to. discuss a 
few essential goals and interests underlying 
Europe's relations, even though no complete con-
sensus exists in all aspects of the opinions here 
expressed. 
32. The Rapporteur is of the opinion that 
Europe's most urgent and inspiring objective 
must be the preservation and guarantee of peace. 
Without the maintenance of peace in freedom, 
neither Emope as a whole nor the individual 
European states and societies can thrive. Under 
contemporary conditions, a war in Europe would 
cause unimaginable destruction of political, eco-
nomic, social and cultural values. 
33. From this fundamental consideration arise 
for the Rapporteur five foreign policy goals 
which, in his view, form the essence of Europe's 
external relations. These are : 
- the preservation of European security ; 
- the continuation and strengthening of 
detente; 
- the protection of raw material supplies 
and the achievement of economic secu-
rity; 
- the continuation of the North-South dia-
logue with the objective of a more equit-
able world economic order ; and 
- the preservation of stability in Southern 
Europe. 
These goals and interests of Europe cannot, of 
course, be so sharply distinguished from one 
another as might appear at first glance. The 
Rapporteur will attempt to clarify the various 
interconnections between these five major objec-
tives and interests insofar as this is feasible 
within the confines of this presentation. 
(i) The preservation of European security 
34. This objective presents, in the Rapporteur's 
analysis, four essential aspects : 
- military security; 
- economic security ; 
- social security; and 
- internal security. 
(a) Military security 
35. Most of the European nations considered 
in this report regard their security as best guaran-
teed through their membership of the Atlantic 
Alliance. These nations believe that in the age 
of nuclear weapons, national efforts alone cannot 
suffice to assure their security in the face of 
the military threat posed by the Soviet Union. 
As mentioned previously, there are various 
degrees of membership of the Alliance and a 
number of European states have chosen not to 
enter the Alliance at all. This is explained in 
some cases by a long tradition of neutrality 
(Sweden, Switzerland), in others by a freely-
chosen neutral status (Austria), and in still 
others by-concerns for national independence and 
because some states perceive less strongly an 
immediate threat through the Soviet Union. For 
Europe as a whole, however, a neutral stance 
would not be tenable : even armed neutrality 
would pose excessive dangers for the security 
of the European states. 
36. In the judgment of the Rapporteur, the 
existence of a political and military balance 
between East and West in Europe forms the pre-
condition for the preservation of peace in this 
region ; such a balance is possible only on the 
basis of an American commitment to and presence 
in Europe. As Chancellor Schmidt pointed out 
in his speech before the United Nations in May 
of this year, the military balance : 
"must not necessarily be expressed in a 
total arithmetic identity in all types of 
weapons and forces. An overall strategic 
parity, however, must exist. It must also be 
psychologically understood and accepted as 
such by the European peoples." 
37. According to the most recent assessment of 
the International Institute for Strategic Studies 
in London, we can proceed from the assumption 
of a military balance of power in Europe which 
largely excludes the possibility of a military 
attack 1 • This balance of power arises from an 
assessment ,of the total military situation. The 
Wa~saw Pact enjoys superiority or is catching 
up in certain fiel,ds, but the overall correlation 
of forces is at present so constituted as to render 
the possibility of an attack unattractive to it, 
according to The Military Balance 1978-79. The 
I. The Military Balance 1978-79, page 113. 
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concept of the balance of power must, however, 
be understood dynamically. This means among 
other things that the military balance can be 
altered by new armament efforts and develop-
ments in weapons technology. In the light of 
this dynamic nature of armament developments, 
the organs of WEU must continue to play their 
part in upholding a military balance of power 
in Europe. 
38. In the view of the Rapporteur, however, it 
is essential clearly to recognise that the military 
balance alone cannot suffice to preserve peace 
and security in Europe. Peace resting exclusively 
on a balance of forces and armaments would by 
its very nature remain precarious. The political 
willingness to negotiate and compromise is neces-
sary as well. To quote Chancellor Schmidt once 
again: "He who is unwilling to compromise 
can accomplish nothing for peace." For Europe, 
this means that military security cannot, in the 
final analysis, be achieved without a political 
readiness for negotiation and detente with the 
leading communist power, the USSR, as well 
as with the other Eastern European states. The 
Rapporteur will comment further on this sub-
ject later in this paper. 
(b) Economic security 
39. Since the oil crisis of 1973 we have all 
become increasingly aware that an assured supply 
of raw materials and the ability to carry on 
· uninterrupted economic activity are as essential 
to our security as military protection. The oil 
shock made clear that the withholding of vital 
supplies can strike at a society almost as hard 
as direct military pressure. 
40. Many Europeans have perceived the oH 
crisis as a real threa;t, and some have introduced 
various proposals, including military scenarios, 
to deal with such a situation. The Rapporteur 
would maintain that Europe's vulnerability in 
this respect cannot be overcome, i.e. that we 
Europeans cannot take refuge in a new faith 
in autarchy. Rather, we must learn to live with 
this vulnerability and demonstrate our willing-
ness to co-operate in an interdependent world 
economy. 
41. As a rule, dependelliCe is seldom one-sided. 
If this were the case, only capitulation before 
the demands of the other side would be imagin-
able. In this connection it appears essential to 
the Rapporteur to emphasise the political wil-
lingness to compromise in all efforts to reduce 
Europe's vulnerability and its dependence, as 
is presently being attempted, in the field of 
energy. Without such a willingness, 'a dependent 
region such as Europe would reel from one crisis 
to another, seriously endangering our economic 
and military security in the process. The Rappor-
teur will return to this subject at another point 
in his presentation. 
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(c) Social security 
42. This aspect of security concerns first of 
all the preservation of social peace. Poverty and 
unemployment can threaten a society from 
within. Social objectives such as full employment, 
price stability and balance of external accounts. 
should therefore not be underestimated in respect 
to external security as well. 
43. Europe has achieved a relatively high 
degree of social security and domestic peace in 
recent years. In comparison to most of the coun-
tries outside Europe, many of the European 
nations may be regarded as socially progressive 
and relatively stable economically. Significant 
disparities, however, still exist on our continent. 
A major long-range objective of European co-
operation must be to eliminate or at least to 
r·educe these disparities. 
(d) Internal security 
44. In the recent past we have all become increas-
ingly aware that terrorism can threaten our 
societies from within. At the same time terrorism 
has proved to be an international phenomenon 
which must be fought at an international level. 
The Council of Europe has made a useful con-
tribution to this effort, and the seven leading 
industrial powers which gathered in an inter-
national economic summit conference last July 
in Bonn found it necessary to issue a joint state-
ment on the struggle against terrorism. 
45. The conflict with terrorism has shown that 
this phenomenon is quite capable of endangering 
the bases of western pluralist democracy. A 
common interest thus exists in acting jointly 
and decisively against terrorism. 
46. These new dimensions of security extend 
far beyond the competence of those European 
institutions concerned primarily with external 
security, namely NATO and WEU. They are 
of importance beyond the borders of the Euro-
pean Community as well, and can be properly 
understood and effectively gua11anteed only in 
a wider context and in a new conscious.ness of 
global interdependence. The Rapporteur would 
maintain that the existing organisations and 
institutions in Europe and beyond are by all 
means adequate to address these new problems 
of European security. 
47. These different institutions and organisa-
tions must, however, carefully harmonise and 
co-ordinate their respective activities in order 
to guarantee maximum success. WEU must pro-
vide its contribution, but it must also recognise 
that in many cases, more comprehensive institu-
tions such as the European Community, NATO, 
the OECD or the Council of Europe can act 
more effectively in regard to the appropriate 
measures. It would be advisable to adopt a 
flexible attitude in dealing with these tasks in 
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order to live up to the complexity of the security 
problems. As the Rapporteur hopes to have 
made clear, these problems involve not only 
external military security, but also numerous 
issues traditionally considered as domestic con-
cerns. 
(ii) The continuation and expansion of detente 
48. Detente, along with military defence, con-
stitutes the second pillar of European security 
policy, as the Harmel report has already recog-
nised in principle. Recognition of detente's 
importance to international security opened, in 
the late sixties and early seventies, a ra;ther large 
area of East-West negotiation through a number 
of agreements between the Soviet Union and the 
United States on the one hand, and the USSR 
and the European nations, particularly the 
Federal Republic of Germany, on the other. The 
most important of these agreements include : 
- the quadripartite agreement on Berlin ; 
- the SALT agreements ; 
- the eastern treaties of the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany ; 
- the final act of the conference on security 
and co-operation in Europe ; as well as 
- a series of bil31teral agreements between 
Eastern and Western European states. 
49. These agreements have created a new frame-
work for decreasing the conflict potential of 
Europe. The Rapporteur is aware that certain 
aspects of detente are understood differently in 
East and West. Detente cannot eliminate the 
fundamental political and ideological contrasts 
between East and ·west : these continue to exist. 
Understood as the process of gradual de-escala-
tion of conflicts and agreement in areas where 
this is possible without abandoning vital inter-
ests, however, detente is a necessary element of 
western security policy to which there is no 
acceptable alternative. This concept of detente 
should really be undisputed, presuming as it does 
a balance of military power between East and 
West as its prerequisite. Its objective is the more 
effective assurance of peace through co-operation 
and the protection of security at a lower level 
of armaments. 
50. Above all, the Helsinki final act constitutes 
in the opinion of the Rapporteur an extraordin-
arily useful instrument of co-operation between 
East and West whose provisions open up a wide 
range of practical collaboration among the Euro-
pean states. The CSCE follow-up conference in 
Belgrade two years after the signing of the final 
act allowed an assessment of the implementation 
of that document's provisions and of further 
measures of detente in Europe. A second follow-
up conference is scheduled for 1980 in Madrid. 
51. The Rapporteur is of the opinion that the 
WEU Assembly should contribute to the pre-
parations for this conference and concern itself 
with the pel'ltinent topics by preparing a timely 
report. In his view, however, one should avoid 
overburdening the process of co-operation in the 
framework of the CSCE with new demands. The 
experience of Belgrade demonstrated that con-
tinuing differences in fundamental questions 
such as human rights do not have to preclude 
collaboration in vital areas such as the economic 
and humanitarian fields ; these latter areas 
should receive closer attention in Madrid than 
was possible at Belgrade. 
52. The Belgrade CSCE follow-up conference 
took place in a period of uncertainty over the 
further progress of detente which arose as a 
result of uncertainties in the Soviet-American 
relationship. The complex reasons for this uncer-
tainty cannot be discussed here in detail. They 
are very complex, but may perhaps be indicated 
by the following factors : 
- intensification of the Soviet Union's 
military build-up combined with an in-
creasing interventionary pressure in 
Africa; 
- new complications in the continuing arms 
control negotiations created by develop-
ments in military technology on both 
sides; and 
- a hardening of Soviet domestic policy 
in response to the protests and demands 
of Soviet civil rights movements. 
53. The Rapporteur believes that this phase of 
uncertainty may now possibly have been sur-
passed and that more promising prospects for 
the development of East-West co-operation have 
again arisen. He draws this conclusion from 
recent encouraging developments in the SALT 
talks and, despite continuing difficulties, in the 
MBFR negotiations in Vienna. As is now 
reported, a personal meeting between President 
Carter and CPSU General Secretary Brezhnev 
may well be in the offing. 
54. The SALT II negotiations between the 
United States and the Soviet Union should be 
completed shortly. The success of these negotia-
tions lies in the interests of Europe as well. The 
progress achieved in the Vienna MBFR negotia-
tions has been above all the Warsaw Pact's accept-
ance in its reply of 8th June 1978 of the prin-
ciple of conventional parity for the reduction 
area. This principle was previously acknowledged 
in the common declaration signed by Federal 
Chancellor Helmut Sehmidt and General Secre-
tary Leonid Brezhnev on 6th May 1978. This 
text states : 
"Both sides deem it important that no one 
should seek military superiority. They pro-
ceed on the assumption that approximate 
equality and parity suffice to safeguard 
defence. They believe that adequate measures 
of disarmament and arms limitation in the 
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nuclear and the conventional fields, which 
meet that principle, would be of major 
significance." 
55. An important question, however, remains to 
be clarified, namely the discrepancy between 
NATO and Warsaw Pact figures concerning 
eastern military personnel in the reduction area. 
The Rapporteur is of the opinion that clarity in 
the question of data must be achieved to prevent 
the negotiations in Vienna from reaching an 
impasse. The Rapporteur would further con-
sider balanced arms control agreements an 
extremely important component of detente. 
56. The central objective of the MBFR nego-
tiations remains a balanced level of forces at 
1ower levels attained through reductions by East 
and West. The SALT talks aim at fixing a 
balance in strategic nuclear weapons by a treaty 
between the Soviet Union and the United States. 
This, however, could increase the significance of 
existing disparities between East and West in 
the conventional and tactical nuclear field. In 
addition, certain nuclear weapons which have 
been excluded from both SALT and the MBFR 
discussions cannot be excluded from considera-
tion in a system of military balance. These 
nuclear weapons, such as the Soviet SS-20 rockets 
targeted at Western Europe, must also be 
included in negotiations. 
57. Europe must also, in the judgment of the 
Rapporteur, accord decisive importance to econo-
mic co-operation between East and West. This 
co-operation is an element of detente which has 
been forced into the background somewhat 
because of the world economic recession. Europe 
must seek new initiatives in this area. 
(iii) The protection of raw material supplies and the 
assurance of economic security 
58. Experts do not presently reckon with a 
critical shortage of raw materials in the near 
future. The problems of inflation, recession, 
balance of payments imbalances and protectionist 
tendencies must apparently be taken much more 
seriously. Europe faces a serious problem with 
respect to its raw material supplies, nonetheless 
- unlike the other industrialised countries with 
the exception of Japan, which finds itself in a 
similar position, it is between 70 and lOO % 
dependent on imports from third countries. The 
United States, by contrast, imports only about 
15 % of its raw material requirements. 
59. It is understandable that this heavy depend-
ence presents difficult problems for all of 
Europe's national economies. The foreign policy 
vulnerability resulting from this dependence 
would become immediately apparent in the event 
of another major crisis such as the 1973 oil 
embargo and subsequent quadrupling or quin-
tupling of oil prices, since raw materials are 
indispensable for industrial production. It is 
quite conceivable that the success of the oil 
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cartel could exercise a kind of domino effect for 
other raw materials. In certain cases this has 
already taken place. 
60. We must recognise, on the other hand, that 
the export of raw materials is a major source of 
monetary reserves for many third world coun-
tries and therefore assumes a key function in 
their growth and employment policies. This fact 
alone points up the connection between raw 
material policy and development policy, the 
North-South dial6gue and the effort to create a 
more equitable international economic order, 
which will be further discussed later in this 
report. 
61. The Rapporteur would especially emphasise 
here that Europe's dependence on foreign raw 
materials cannot, in principle, be eliminated. 
Partially, substitution possibilities may exist, 
perhaps combined with limits on consumption in 
the consuming countries, but one cannot com-
pletely put an end to the fundamental problem 
of raw material dependence. Europe has largely 
exhausted its own raw material reserves. 
62. In this situation, economic security can be 
secured only by political means and this means 
that a solution to Europe's problems can be 
found only in conjunction with the raw material 
producers. Thus co-operation rather than con-
frontation must be the guideline for Europe's 
foreign policy. This requires due consideration 
for the needs and opportunities of the developing 
countries in the context of a raw material policy 
for Europe. 
(iv) The continuation of the North-South dialogue 
with the goal of a more equitable international 
economic order 
63. Closely connected with this Jast-mentioned 
objective is thus the continuation of the North-
South dialogue and the construction of a more 
equitable international economic order. The 
demands of the developing countries in this 
respect have been well-known since the United 
Nations declaration on the establishment of a 
new international economic order of 1st May 
1974. They include inter alia : 
- every nations's free choice of its economic 
and social system ; 
- complete and permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources and all economic activ-
ity; 
- adoption of an integrated programme to 
stabilise raw material prices through 
arrangements patterned after the Lome 
Convention and providing for buffer 
stocks under a common fund to stabilise 
the developing countries' income from 
raw material exports; 
- promotion of producers' cartels in 
developing countries; 
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- industrialisation of the developing coun-
tries with the objective of assuring them 
at least one-fifth of the world's industrial 
production by the year 2000 ; 
- instruments and mechanisms for the 
transfer of technology under equitable 
oonditions ; 
- granting of preferences to developing 
countries and non-reciprocal treatment in 
all areas of internationail economic co-
operation; 
- development assistance without conditions 
amounting to at least 0.7% of the indus-
trialised nations' GNPs ; 
- a link between development assistance 
and the creation of new special drawing 
rights in the IMF ; 
- a solution to the third world countries' 
problem of indebtedness ; and 
- a greater voice for the developing coun-
tries in the IMF and other international 
organisations. 
64. The Rapporteur is of the op1mon that 
Europe must not close itself to the legitimate 
demands of the developing countries, even though 
protection of their own vital interests is of course 
a legitimate right of the European countries as 
well. Europe should not acquire the reputation 
of a club of rich societies unwilling to meet the 
third world countries half-way. Rather, it should 
seek to find suitable compromises in appropriate 
international conferences and in the United 
Nations General Assembly. 
65. The Rapporteur would point in this con-
nection to the work of the international North-
South commission under the chairmanship of 
Willy Brandt. He expects from this commission's 
report important initiatives for the policy of the 
European states. He believes further that the 
long-range interests of the industrial and the 
developing nations are not contradictory but 
complementary and reveal common perspectives 
as well. 
66. With a certain apprehension we must also 
observe that the international weapons trade, 
particularly the export of weapons to third world 
countries, is increasing considerably. A growing 
demand for armaments on the part of countries 
in the third world, along with growing export 
pressures within the industrialised nations, could 
create a dangerous momentum. Global expendi-
tures on armaments in 1977 are estimated at 
about $400 thousand million. The total value of 
weapon transfers to the third world has increased 
sharp,ly. For so-called heavy weapons alone it 
amounted to around $7.3 thousand million in 
1976, as compared to $2 thousand million in 
1966 (expressed in constant prices). 
67. Regrettable in this connection is the Soviet 
Union's apparent propensity to limit its rela-
tionship to the third wor1d largely to the delivery 
of weapons. In the view of the Rapporteur, 
serious steps should be taken better to control 
arms exports in the future. The export of 
weapons is not an appropriate form of foreign 
aid. The European nations should contribute to 
developing effective international instruments of 
control and assist in transforming military into 
peaceful technology. 
(v) Assuring the stability of Southern Europe 
68. If Europe is to develop successful and 
stable foreign relations, it must also find convinc-
ing solutions for the problems which exist in its 
midst. The experience of the continuing crisis 
in Cyprus demonstrates that Europe can opti-
mally exercise its function of assuring peace 
abroad only when it is able to overcome its own 
internal conflicts. Whether Europe possesses 
this ability will be borne out in no small measure 
by whether it will prove capable of providing 
an effective contribution to the stabilisation of 
Southern Europe. This task is directly related 
to its commitment of solidarity with less-
developed Southern Europe. 
69. It is now certain that G:reece, Spain and 
Portugal are firmly committed to applying for 
membership of the European Community. This is 
a welcome step in the interest of stabilising demo-
cracy in these countries. 
70. Moreover, the entrance of Spain and Por-
tugal into the European Community means at 
the same time that both nations can assume a 
bridge-building function with respect to Latin 
America. Both nations have historically main-
tained close ties to Latin America which rest 
upon a common cultural tradition. Further, fol-
lowing the end of its colonial domination in 
Africa, Portugal can now play a very useful 
role in European-African relations as well. 
71. The Rapporteur is particularly pleased that 
the governments of the Economic Community 
member states have agreed in principie to these 
countries' admission. He would, however, point 
out in this connection that the accession of these 
nations will not only make evident social and 
economic problems within the countries willing 
to accede which- for a solution- will require 
specific measures of assistance on the part of 
the European Community. Perhaps an even 
greater concern is the economic gap that could 
arise between the developed north of Europe and 
the entire southern region of the continent. The 
entry of Greece, Spain and Portugal into the 
European Community will create economic diffi-
culties especially for Turkey, Cyprus, Malta and 
the other Mediterranean states which will like-
wise require Europe's attention. 
72. A further question arises with respect to 
Yugoslavia. The Rapporteur believes that the 
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p11oblems of those countries in Southern Europe 
which, at least for the foreseeable future, are not 
able to join the European Commmity also 
urgently require solutions in order to prevent 
their estrangement from the rest of Europe, 
especially the European Community. He would 
therefore raise the question of whether Europe 
should commit itself to a special programme of 
economic solidarity for this region. The Rappor-
teur believes that such a solidarity programme 
would lie in the interest of the donor as well as 
of the recipient countries. Europe could thereby 
provide an important example of its capacity for 
effective foreign policy action and its determina-
tion to provide practical assistance. 
V. Summary 
73. It is certainly not yet possible at this point 
in time to speak of a unified, co-ordinated Euro-
pean foreign policy. Above all, a number of 
internal prerequisites for such a development are 
lacking. Nonetheless, in the Rapporteur's view a 
web of external relations has grown up among 
the democratic states of Europe which reveals 
a unified pattern and which, despite all varia-
tions in national interests, shows a series of com-
mon features. Outstanding among these is the 
high degree of Europe's dependence and vulner-
ability owing to its economic and military 
position. Europe can guarantee its security only 
within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance. 
Hence arises the common interest of preserving 
Europe as a force for peace, conciliation and 
detente and of developing a foreign policy charac-
terised by a willingness to co-operate with all 
parts of the world. Europe can best develop its 
influence in the world not 'as a military but as a 
civil power. 
74. Europe's most vital interests include: 
- the maintenance of its security ; 
- the continuation and expansion of 
detente; 
- the assurance of raw material supplies 
and the maintenance of economic secu-
rity; 
- the continuation of the North-South dia-
logue with the goal of a more equitable 
international economic order ; and 
- the assurance of stability in Southern 
Europe. 
75. Without desiring to overestimate Europe's 
position in the world, one may observe that these 
objectives present a common challenge which 
demands of the democratic states of Europe con-
siderable energy in maintaining their common 
security. 
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